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Popular Attitudes toward Markets and Democracy:
Russia and United States Compared 25 Years Later
We repeat a survey we did in the waning days of the Soviet Union (Shiller, Boycko and 
Korobov, AER 1991) comparing attitudes towards free markets between Moscow and New 
York. Additional survey questions, from Gibson Duch and Tedin (J. Politics 1992) are added to 
compare attitudes towards democracy. Two comparisons are made: between countries, and 
through time, to explore the existence of international differences in allegiance to democratic 
free-market institutions, and the stability of these differences. While we find some differences 
in attitudes towards markets across countries and through time, we do not find most of the 
differences large or significant. Our evidence does not support a common view that the Russian 
personality is fundamentally illiberal or non-democratic.
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Public attitudes toward markets and toward democracy are fundamental to the well-functioning 
of an economy and a society. Attitudes toward markets and attitudes toward democracy are 
naturally connected: both are about individual freedoms, how they should be allowed, how the 
freedoms can be assured, or, on the other hand, how they should be limited.
In 1990, a year before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, while one of us, Boycko, lived in 
Moscow, and while the other, Shiller, lived in New Haven, in the greater New York area, we did 
a telephone survey of the general public in the respective cities (with Ukrainian survey expert 
Vladimir Korobov) about attitudes toward markets. Questions were about fair prices and income 
inequality, resistance to exchange of money, lack of appreciation for incentives, and hostility 
toward business, (see Shiller et al (1991)). The questions, as well as questions in our follow-up
survey Shiller et al (1992), were identical as far as the translation between Russian and English 
would allow, and as far as our impressions of how the questions would be understood could be. 
We designed questions that would reveal the underpinnings of attitudinal differences between the 
countries, based on our personal impressions in our respective countries of the significant 
underlying differences. Our questions avoided direct use of abstract concepts, like “markets” or 
“capitalism”, as we were concerned that these may have subtly different meanings in the two 
countries, colored by culture, associations, prevailing senses of politically correct usage, etc.
Instead we asked respondents about their behavior in, or evaluations of, imaginary scenarios that 
resemble real life situations that the respondents in both countries were likely familiar with.
In the same year, 1990, political scientists James Gibson, Raymond Duch and Kent Tedin, 
(1992) did a telephone survey in Moscow with questions about attitudes toward democracy. We
felt their survey contained some of the same spirit as ours and similar methodology. Although 
Gibson et al (1992) did not provide an explicit comparison with US or another developed 
democracy, they largely avoided asking directly about “democracy”, “competition among political 
parties”, or “strong leader”.1 Instead, their respondents were mostly asked to evaluate social rules 
applied to specific situations or scenarios. The questions probed attitudes to social norms, 
freedoms, rights consciousness, tolerance of minority views, support for dissent, etc.
1 A good example of this more direct approach to measuring Russian political attitudes is Hale (2011).  See Guriev et al 2008 and Treisman 
(2011, pp 377-388) for recent surveys of this literature.
In this paper, we report on a new survey that we have done in 2015, twenty-five years after these 
1990 surveys. The script for the interviewer had as its first part the identical questions that we 
asked in 1990 (then called Questionnaire B), and in the identical order, followed by seven of the 
questions asked by Gibson et al, though not an exact ordered sequence of their question scripts.
Since the Gibson et al. survey in 1990 was in Russian only, we did a retranslation of their original 
Russian questions into English, making slight improvements in the accuracy of the translation over 
the English translation of the questions that were presented in the Gibson et al. (1992) paper.2
Knowing that answers to questionnaires are influenced by framing, and by the previous 
questions asked, we wanted to make the procedure identical through time as much as possible, 
which is something we could do for the first part of the interviews.  The details of the 1990 surveys 
are in Shiller et al. (1991) and Gibson et al. (1992). The 2015 Russian survey, carried out in 
Moscow in November 2015 by the Russian survey firm ADAPT, produced 301 responses, 151 
from landline and 150 from mobile, while the United States survey, carried out in Greater New 
York City November 2015 by Survey Sampling Inc., produced 300 responses, 170 from landline 
and 130 from mobile.  Additional characteristics of the five surveys are in Table A1 below.
I. Changes in Russia and in the United States over 25 Years
Since 1990, Russia has experienced tectonic changes in its economic and political system,
largely succeeding in building a market economy, but failing to develop a functioning democracy.
The EBRD transition indicators index for Russia, that tracks progress in market reforms against 
standards of industrialized market economies along six dimensions, has increased from an average 
of 1.0 in 1990 to 3.3 in 2014 (the index range is from 1.0 to 4.3). The gains in the Polity2 index 
for Russia, that measures the level of democracy, were more modest: from 0 in 1990 to 4 in 2014
(the range is from -10 to 10). 
A popular interpretation in recent years is that Russians' attitudes have been to blame for the 
lack of progress on democracy, that Russians understand the workings and advantages of free 
markets, but not of democracy. In 2004, Russian oligarch-turned-dissident Mikhail Khodorkovsky,
2 We are grateful to Michael Gronas, professor of Russian language and literature at Dartmouth College, who helped verify the accuracy of 
these retranslations.
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while serving his prison term, had the following to say about President Vladimir Putin: he “is 
probably neither liberal, nor democratic. But he is still more liberal and democratic than 70 percent
of our country’s population "3.
While illiberal and non-democratic attitudes are certainly common in Russia, the question is how 
frequent they are compared to the same attitudes in developed democracies. Gibson et al (1992) 
showed that these frequencies were in fact low in 1990, generally comparable to those observed 
in developed countries with functioning democracies.  An important objective of our 2015 surveys
was to explore if the frequencies of non-democratic attitudes are still low in Russia and to compare 
them directly to United States.
Another recent development in Russia is massive and, admittedly, effective government 
propaganda effort4, which has a substantial anti-Western component. “Western democracy” is 
generally portrayed as dysfunctional, amoral, hypocritical, etc., which has likely damaged public 
perception of the concept of democracy, and might have affected the fundamental attitudes to it as 
well.  We believe that in the current, “propaganda-intensive” environment, responses to the 
questions in our survey, mostly focused on social rules applied to specific situations, have a better 
chance of revealing fundamental public attitudes than the more direct questions about democracy.
In the United States, economic and political changes since 1990 appear less dramatic. In 1990 
Ronald Reagan’s free market revolution was still new, but already suffering from concerns that 
deregulation had spawned a savings and loan crisis. By 2015, doubts about free markets were 
reinforced by the 2008 financial crisis. Doubts can be observed through social movements such as 
the Occupy Wall Street movement in 2011, the surge of concern with inequality as with Piketty 
(2014), the expressions of fears of dangers to working people from robotics destroying economic 
power of working people, and the enthusiastic reception to socialist Bernie Sanders of 2015.
Changes in the two countries over the 25 year period presented certain challenges for our survey 
methodology and data analysis. The proliferation of mobile phones in both countries required us
to get representative samples of the users of the two kinds of telephones. Large shifts in the 
composition of the underlying populations of Moscow and New York necessitated additional 
attention to control variables. However, probit regressions with controls for age, sex, education 
3 As quoted in Myers (2015), p 253.
4 See Pomerantsev (2014) for a lively journalistic account.
level, foreign origin, rural origin, and cell phone confirmed statistical significance of “large” 
differences between countries or over time with only a few exceptions.
When presenting our results below we report the frequencies of “anti-market” and “anti-
democracy” responses.  In calculating these frequencies we omit “No answer” responses from the 
denominator.  Same-year differences between the two countries that in our probit regressions are 
statistically significant at 5% and at 1% are marked by “C” and “CC”, respectively; statistically 
significant differences within a country over time (between 1990 and 2015) are marked by “T” (at 
5%) and “TT” (at 1%).
II. Attitudes toward Free Markets
Our original conclusion from the 1990 survey was that attitudes toward markets were 
surprisingly similar between Russia and the United States. We find they are generally as similar
in 2015, maybe even more so.
For example, in our 1990 survey we asked a question that referred to demand-induced increases 
of prices of flowers on holidays, implicitly alluding to the International Woman’s Day in Russia, 
when even in the Soviet times men routinely bought flowers for wives and girlfriends, and to
Mothers’ Day in the U.S.:
B2. “On a holiday, when there is a great demand for flowers, their prices usually go up.  Is it 
fair for flowers sellers to raise their prices like this?”
M90 NY90 M15 NY15
No 66% 68%T 67%CC 55%TCC
We see that in both countries people are opposed to this outcome of free markets: higher prices 
are unfair. The only change here we observe in 2015 – relatively small in magnitude, but
statistically significant – relates to New York, where tolerance to price hikes have actually 
increased, not decreased, as movements like Occupy Wall Street might suggest.
We sharpened the same question by removing any possible cost justification for increased prices, 
and still get similar results:
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B11. “A small factory produces kitchen tables and sells them at $1000 each. There is so much 
demand for the tables that it cannot meet it fully. The factory decides to raise the price of its tables 
by $100, when there was no change in the costs of producing tables. Is this fair?”
M90 NY90 M15 NY15
No 66% 70% 68%C 57%C
(Prices were indexed to inflation in both B11 and B7 below, and presented in local currency.)
A follow-up question asked about the policy implications of these fairness judgements:
B3. “Should the government introduce limits on the increase in prices of flowers, even if it might 
produce a shortage of flowers?”
M90 NY90 M15 NY15
Yes 54%CC 28%CC 43%CC 22%CC
Here a significant difference remains between Russians and Americans, although now in both 
countries respondents are less supportive of government regulation.5
Another follow-up question was about whether the factory should have the right to increase 
prices:
B12. “Apart from fairness, should the factory have the right to raise the price in this situation?”
M90 NY90 M15 NY15
No 43%TT 41% 53%TTCC 35%CC
In this case we register a statistically significant, even if not large, shift in attitudes in Moscow 
in the “anti-market” direction both over time and relative to New York.6
We also explored perception of speculation as a potential reason for price increases.  In 1990, 
Russians were less likely than Americans to attribute a price increase in world markets to 
speculators’ efforts.  Today, these attitudes have effectively reversed across countries: Russians 
5 The changes over time in both countries, however, are not statistically significant.
6 Our probit regression reveals that education has stronger effect on responses to B12 than geography:  those with education level of “some 
college” or higher are 20 percentage points less likely to answer “no” than the lesser educated part of the sample.
are more likely to hold speculators responsible, while Americans are skeptical of speculators’ 
capabilities.
B6. “If the price of coffee on the world market suddenly increased by 30%, what do you think is 
likely to be to blame? [Responses:] 1. Interventions of some government. 2. Such things as bad 
harvest in Brazil or unexpected changes in demand. 3. Speculators’ effort to raise prices.”
M90 NY90 M15 NY15
3. Speculators’ effort to raise 
prices 32%TTCC 51%TTCC 54%TTCC 33%TTCC
One of the differences that surprised us in the 1990 survey was that Americans were more 
intolerant than Russians of compensated price increases, including a compensated increase in the 
aggregate level of prices.  Today the level of intolerance is the same in two countries, at about 
65%.
B10. “Suppose that economists have come to the conclusion that we could substantially improve 
our standard of living in the next year if we would be willing to accept a thirty percent inflation 
rate (increase in the prices of goods by 30%). This would mean that our incomes would rise by 
more than 30%. Then we could buy more goods at the new higher prices. Would you support such 
a proposal?”
M90 NY90 M15 NY15
No 53%
C 72%C 63% 65%
Back in 1990 we found some evidence that Russians were, to a certain extent, less willing than 
Americans to accept exchange of money as a solution to problems.  In 2015, we observe smaller 
differences between countries, although they remain statistically significant, as in responses to the 
question below:
B7. “You are standing in a long line to buy something. You see that someone comes to the line 
and is very distressed that the line is so long, saying he is in a great hurry and absolutely must 
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make this purchase. A person at the front of the line offers to let him take his place in line for $50. 
Would you be annoyed at this deal even though it won't cause you to wait any longer?”
M90 NY90 M15 NY15
Yes 69%
TCC 44%CC 57%TCC 44%CC
In 1990 we were surprised to find only a small (and not statistically significant) difference 
between Russians and Americans in their level of concern about a possible future government 
confiscation of savings. Although soon after our survey people’s savings in Russia were wiped out 
by the government printing money, this experience apparently had no lasting effect, as evidenced 
in responses to the following question:
B8. “How likely is it, from your point of view, that the government in the next few years will take 
measures, in one way or another, to prevent those who have saved a great deal from making use 
of their savings? Is it quite likely, possible, unlikely or impossible that the government will do 
this?”
M90 NY90 M15 NY15
“quite likely”+”possible” 61% 52% 50% 54%
Still, at around 50%, the level of concern about confiscation of savings remains substantial in 
both countries, actually.
Another unexpected result of the 1990 study was Russians’ relative willingness to make large 
risky investments in a business of a group of friends.  Perhaps due to negative experience or 
improved investment opportunities this willingness has declined and there are no intercountry 
differences here anymore:
B5. “Suppose that a group of your friends are starting a business that you think is very risky and 
could fail but might also make investors in that business rich.  Would you be tempted to invest a 
substantial portion of your savings in it?”
M90 NY90 M15 NY15
No
59%TT 67% 71%TT 75%
Transition to a market economy improves labor incentives by making consumer goods and 
services available at market clearing prices, rather than through queues and other non-price 
rationing mechanisms. We see evidence of this in a sharp, 31-percentage point, increase in
Russians’ willingness to work hard to earn more money, as documented below:
B9. “Suppose that for certain reasons you are offered a 10% increase in the duties you perform 
at your work place with the following terms: your workweek will be increased by 1/10 (say, you 
will work an additional half a day) and your take-home pay will also increase by 10%.  If you take 
this offer, this has no other effects on your prospects for promotion or relations with co-workers.  
Do you consider it attractive to have less free time, but more money, so that you would take this 
offer, or would you decide to reject it?”
M90 NY90 M15 NY15
I will definitely reject the offer 73%TTCC 51%CC 42%TTCC 58%CC
Americans willingness to work harder for money has slightly decreased over the period and they 
are now behind Russians in this respect7.
In responses to another work-related question, we document a moderate “anti-market” shift in 
Russians’ views of whether it is appropriate to take initiative at work:
“In your opinion, which of the following statements is closer to the truth? 1) An employee who 
works hard and has the best interests of the business at heart can be worth twice as much to his 
company as less well-motivated employee. 2) As a rule, an employee should generally do just what 
he is told- trying to do much more is likely to do more harm than help. “
M90 NY90 M15 NY15
2)              11%T 11% 20%TCC 10%CC
And today, as 25 years ago, Russians remain more interested than Americans in becoming 
wealthy through success in business:
7 In 1990, only 2% of respondents in Moscow worked in private firms, while in 2015 42% did.  In New York, the change was in the other 
direction: from 53% in 1990 to 43% in 2015.
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B4. “Which of the following achievements would please you more?” [Response choices: 1) You 
win fortune without fame: you make enough money through successful business dealings so that 
you can live very comfortably for the rest of your life; 2) You win fame without fortune: for 
example, you win a medal at the Olympics or you become a respected journalist or scholar.]
M90 NY90 M15 NY15
2)              35% 46% 33%CC 48%CC
As a general summary of these results, while there are differences, we see a basic similarity 
across countries and through time. Sometimes Russians have a dimmer view of free market 
outcomes and incentives, sometimes the Americans.
III. Attitudes toward Democracy 
In Table 1 below we present frequencies of “anti-democratic” responses to seven questions about 
democracy from Gibson et al (1992) in the three subsamples. The “anti-democratic” responses are 
“agree” or “completely agree” in questions B13, B14, B15, and B18, but “disagree” or “completely 
disagree” in B16, B17, and B19 (we reordered and renumbered Gibson’s questions)
In responses to three out of the seven questions (B13, B14, B15) we document an increase in 
anti-democratic attitudes in Moscow between 1990 and 20158 and these same attitudes are the only 
ones that appear substantially stronger in Moscow than in New York in 2015.
We observe a regrettable increase in Russians’ intolerance of minority views, as evidenced in 
responses to B13.  But, at 37%, the frequency of this intolerance remains below 50% and not too 
far from that of Americans (29%).  
In 1990, most Russians used to support the freedom of demonstrations by radical and extremist 
groups that may lead to disorder and destruction (question B14), in 2015 they no longer do. But 
in 2015 Russians may overreact to the words “radical” and “extremist” that are heavily employed 
by government propaganda, with its emphasis on discrediting “color revolutions” in neighboring 
countries. Nevertheless, the difference with Americans is large, at 31 percentage points.
8 Strictly speaking, the results of our 2015 survey and those of Gibson et al (1992) are not directly comparable because of differences in survey 
methodology (telephone interviews vs. in-home interviews) and geography (Moscow vs. Moscow region). Significance tests reported in the table 
below for changes through time in their Moscow questions also do not account for any control variables.
Still, the largest difference with Americans that we found, of 41 percentage points in responses 
to question B15, relates to a preference for a society with strict order at the expense of some 
freedoms that may bring “destruction to the society”. This preference, at 76% in Moscow today, 
is not too different from 69%, recorded by Gibson et al (1992) 25 years ago.9
The other differences between Russians and Americans in attitudes toward democracy, as 
evidenced in responses to questions B16-B19 in Table 1, appear fairly small and unimportant, or 
go in the other direction.
Is the glass of Russians’ attitudes to democracy half-full or half-empty? While in several respects 
“pro-democracy” attitudes are not as strong in Russia today as 25 years ago and weaker than those 
of contemporary Americans, we find strong correlation between our survey results and those of 
Gibson et al (1992) who “… discovered far more support for democratic values in Moscow than 
[they] anticipated” (p. 360).
IV. Interpretation of Results
Back in 1990, before the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the launch of President Yeltsin’s 
market reforms, a common view in Russia was that ordinary Russians are “not ready” for the 
transition to a market economy, because they do not understand the markets and have different 
values.  The impact of Shiller et. al. (1991), despite its finding of some interesting attitudinal 
differences between Russians and Americans, was to demonstrate that this view was really not 
supported by evidence. Today, after 25 years of development of markets in Russia, that old view 
sounds almost ridiculous. The new evidence presented in this paper, building on the earlier results 
of Gibson et al (1992), again uncovers some differences between Russians and Americans in their 
attitudes toward democracy. Yet on balance the evidence does not support a parallel common 
view that the Russian personality is fundamentally illiberal or non-democratic.   Perhaps at some 
point in the future this view will sound ridiculous, too.
9 One caveat that we have about this result is the accuracy of the translation: despite our best efforts to find the proper English equivalent, the 
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M90 M15 NY15
B13. Society shouldn't have to put up with people whose 




B14. Because demonstrations frequently lead to disorder 
and destruction, radical and extremist political groups 
should be forbidden to demonstrate.
[Agree]
37%TT 59%TTCC 29%CC
B15. It is better to live in a society with strict order than 
to allow people so much freedom that they can bring 
destruction to the society.
[Agree] 69%
T 76%TCC 36%CC
B16. No matter what a person's political beliefs are, he 
should be provided with the same political rights and 
defense as anyone else.
[Disagree]
2% 3%CC 7%CC
B17. It is necessary that everyone, regardless of their 
views, can express themselves freely.
[Disagree] 6% 8% 4%
B18. If someone is suspected of high treason or other 
serious crimes he may be put to prison without trial.
[Agree] 18% 15% 19%
B19. The press should be protected by the law from 
persecution by the government.
[Disagree] 2%TT 20%TTC 27%C
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Appendix
1. U.S. Questionnaire, 2015
2. Russia Questionnaire, 2015
3. Table A1 : Characteristics of the Five Surveys: Moscow, 1990 and 2015; Moscow 
Oblast, 1990; New York, 1990 and 2015.
Introduction:  
 
Hi my name is___ I am calling on behalf of Cowles Foundation for Research on Economics at 
Yale University. We are conducting a survey of public opinion of residents of the greater New 
York City area. Our interview touches on attitude to economic problems. We are not selling 
anything and your responses are strictly confidential and anonymous. Is this a good time to 
participate? 
 
Agent note: terminate business phone numbers and dispose them accordingly in the sample. 
 
QS1. Are you at least 18 years old? 
 
1. Yes- continue to QB1 
2. No- proceed to QS1_1 
 
Qs1_1. Is there any other member in your household who is at least 18 years old? 
 
1. Yes- loop back intro 
2. No- callback 
 
1. An employee who works hard and has the best interests of the business at heart can be 
worth twice as much to his company as less well-motivated employee. 
2. As a rule, an employee should generally do just what he is told- trying to do much more 
is likely to do more harm than help. 
3. No answer 
B2. On a holiday, when there is a great demand for flowers, their prices usually go up.  Is it fair 
for flowers sellers to raise their prices like this? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. No answer 
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B3. Should the government introduce limits on the increase in prices of flowers, even if it might 
produce a shortage of flowers? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. No answer 
B4. Which of the following achievements would please you more? 
1. You win fortune without fame: you make enough money through successful business 
dealing so that you can live very comfortably for the rest of your life. 
2. You win fame without fortune: for example you win a medal at the Olympics or you 
become a respected journalist or scholar. 
3. No answer 
B5. Suppose that a group of your friends are starting a business that you think is very risky and 
could fail but might also make investors in that business rich.  Would you be tempted to invest a 
substantial portion of your savings in it? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. No answer 
B6. If the price of coffee on the world market suddenly increased by 30%, what do you think is 
likely to be to blame? 
1. Interventions of some government. 
2. Such things as bad harvest in Brazil or unexpected changes in demand. 
3. Speculators’ effort to raise prices 
4. No answer 
B7. You are standing in a long line to buy something. You see that someone comes to the line 
and is very distressed that the line is so long, saying he is in a great hurry and absolutely must 
make this purchase. A person at the front of the line offers to let him take his place in line for $50.
Would you be annoyed at this deal even though it won’t cause you to wait any longer? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. No answer 
B8. How likely is it, from your point of view, that the government in the next few years will take 
measures, in one way or another, to prevent those who have saved a great deal from making use 
of their savings? Is it quite likely, possible, unlikely or impossible that the government will do 
this? 




5. No answer 
B9. Suppose that for certain reasons you are offered a 10% increase in the duties you perform at 
your work place with the following terms: your workweek will be increased by 1/10 (say, you will 
work an additional half a day) and your take-home pay will also increase by 10%.  If you take this 
offer, this has no other effects on your prospects for promotion or relations with co-workers.  Do 
you consider it attractive to have less free time, but more money, so that you would take this offer, 
or would you decide to reject it? 
1. I will definitely reject the offer. 
2. I will be more or less indifferent 
3. I will definitely accept the offer 
4. No answer 
B10. Suppose that economists have come to the conclusion that we could substantially improve 
our standard of living in the next year if we would be willing to accept a thirty percent inflation 
rate (increase in the prices of goods by 30%). This would mean that our incomes would rise by 





3. No answer 
B11. A small factory produces kitchen tables and sells them at $1000 each. There is so much 
demand for the tables that it cannot meet it fully. The factory decides to raise the price of its tables 
by $100, when there was no change in the costs of producing tables. Is this fair? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. No answer 
B12. Apart from fairness, should the factory have the right to raise the price in this situation? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. No answer 
Now I would like to read to you several statements and to ask if you completely agree, agree, 
disagree, or completely disagree with each of them. 
B13.  Society shouldn’t have to put up with people whose political views are fundamentally 
different from the views of majority. 




5. Completely Disagree 
6. Don’t know 
B14.  Because demonstrations frequently lead to disorder and destruction, radical and extremist 
political groups should be forbidden to demonstrate. 




5. Completely Disagree 
6. Don’t know 
B15.  It is better to live in a society with strict order than to allow people so much freedom that 
they can bring destruction to the society. 




5. Completely Disagree 
6. Don’t know 
B16.  No matter what a person’s political beliefs are, he should be provided with the same 
political rights and defense as anyone else. 





6. Don’t know 
B17.  It is necessary that everyone, regardless of their views, can express themselves freely. 




5. Completely Disagree 
6. Don’t know 
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B18.  If someone is suspected of high treason or other serious crimes he may be put to prison 
without trial. 




5. Completely Disagree 
6. Don’t know 
B19. The press should be protected by the law from persecution by the government.




5. Completely Disagree 
6. Don’t know 
 
Now I just have a few background questions to ask you. 
 
Q21. What is your level of education? 
 
1. Did not finish high school 
2. Finished high school 
3. Finished high school with special training (e.g. trade school) 
4. Some college 
5. Finished college 
6. Finished graduate school 
7. Don’t Know / Refused 
 







6. Don’t Know / Refused 
 
Prognote: Ask Q23 only if Q22=2 




3. Don’t know / refused 
 
Q24. What is your age? 
 
____ in years; accept codes 18-98 ; code 99 for Don’t Know / Refused 
 
 
Q25. Did you grow up in the greater New York City Area? 
 
1. Yes- skip to Q28 
2. No- ask Q26 
3. Don’t Know / Refused- ask Q26 
 
Q26. If not, did you come here: 
 
1. From another city? 
2. From a rural area? 
3. From another country? 
4. Don’t Know / Refused 
 












5. Don’t Know / Refused 
 
Q29. DO NOT ASK. By Observation. 




3. Don’t Know 
 
 
Those are all the questions we have for you. Thank you for your time! 
?
____________________________________________________________________________
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